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Abstract
The Newcomb’s paradox is one of the most known paradox in Game
Theory about the Oracles. We will define the graph associated to the
time lines of the Game. After this Studying its topology and using only
the Expected Utility Principle we will formulate a solution of the paradox
able to explain all the classical cases.
1 Introduction
The Newcomb’s Paradox was exposed the first time in the paper written by
Nozick in [1], a paper between the Game Theory [2] and philosophy. The para-
dox is essentially a game between two players S and C. The player S plays first.
he uses an oracle Ω to know what C will do. C plays after S, but he doesn’t
know what S has chosen. S has two choices S1 and S2. Symmetrically C has
two choices C1 and C2. Because of the fact that S is the first to play, C’s utility
function is dependent from the choice of S. The utilities are shown in table
Utility C1 C2
S1 10000 0
S2 1010000 1000000
Where the utilities are in euros. Now the problem is how can C maximize his
utility?
To solve the problem Nozick introduced two approaches, one based on dom-
inant strategy and one based on the expected utility function. This approaches
was used in combination to solve 6 different situations. Our aims are to create
an alternative solution to the problems with the Expected Utility Function and
analyze the graph of time lines to create an algorithm to test numerically the
predictions.
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2 State of the Art
This problem was inspired (as said by the same Nozick) by Sci-Fi. The main
issue of the problem is the presence of the oracle Ω, which let S predict the
future. Then even if S plays first, he knows what C will do.
The first approach is based on Expected Utility Function. It observes that
S forecasts future (we will see that is more complicated than this). Then if C
choose C1 the utility must be 1000. Otherwise the utility must be 1000000. For
this reasoning the best choice for C is C2.
The second approach is based on dominant strategy. It starts from the
assumption that the oracle Ω can fail. Then the choice C1 gives an utility
greater of 10000 than C2 in every case. In other words it is a dominant strategy.
The fact that they are logically both valid, required a mathematical in-
vestigation to classify 6 different cases. In each cases he used one of the two
approaches. For the classification see [1]. We will reduce this classification to
two distinct cases: The response of S depends on the choice of C or not.
3 Classic approach
A classic approach to the problem is based on the probability. We start defining
the utility table as
Utility C1 C2
S1 v11 v12
S2 v21 v22
where vij is a positive real for every couple of indexes. We also define the
probabilities ρij = P (S = Si|C = Cj) for i, j = 1, 2.
Now we calculate the Expected Utility Function for the choice Cj as
Uj = v1jρ1j + v2jρ2j , ∀j = 1, 2.
Observing that ρ1j + ρ2j = 1 for every j, we define p1 = ρ11 and p2 = ρ22. So
the previous equations become
U1 = v11ρ11 + v21(1− ρ11) = v21 + p1(v11 − v21)
and
U2 = v12(1 − ρ22) + v22ρ22 = v12 + p2(v22 − v12).
C will choose choice C1 if and only if
v21 + p1(v11 − v21) = U1 ≥ U2 = v12 + p2(v22 − v12)
which leads to the inequality in p1 and p2
v21 + p1(v11 − v21) ≥ v12 + p2(v22 − v12).
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Figure 1: In figure is depicted the graphical solution of the inequality. In the
Red area C will choose C1 and in the Blue area will choose C2. Can also be seen
two standard cases: The perfect predictor (green dot) and the random predictor
(yellow dot).
With the classical values v11 = 10000, v12 = 0, v21 = 1010000 and v22 =
1000000 the inequality takes the form
p2 ≤ 1.01− p1
which is solved graphically in Fig. 1.
Three important cases are when p1 = p2 = 1, which means that Ω never fails,
when p1 = p2 = 0.5, which means that Ω has a random behavior, and finally
when p1 + p2 = 1, when the S’s response is uncorrelated from the action of C.
As can be seen the classical two approach are modelized by the Expected Utility
Function, in fact the green and the yellow dots represent different strategies.
4 Time Lines
The classical approach does not explain how the game works, but only analyzes
the results of the game. The step that we want to do is to explain the dynamics
of the game with sufficient detail to simulate it. But to do it we need a new way
of thinking. We firstly introduce the notion of directed graph [3]. A graph is an
object made up by a set of nodes V and a set of edges E ⊆ V ×V . Every edges
has a starting node and an arriving node, so an edge can be seen as an arrow
from a node to an other node. Now the time lines graph (TLG) is a graph.
This graph is constructed from the principle of temporal causality. Let’s make
a simple example. The list
1. open the door;
3
2. switch on the lights;
3. sit down;
is a sequence of actions (an algorithm). Now we can construct a graph with
nodes the actions (so Valg = {(1), (2), (3)}) and we add an edge every time
there is a relation of temporal causality. For example the action (2) follows the
action (1), then we add add an edge starting from (1) to (2). So the resulting
graph (a time line) is
(1)→ (2)→ (3).
Then we define the TLG as the graph representing all the time lines of the
players.
It is easy to imagine that in a good time line the resulting graph must be a
line starting from the first action done and arriving to the last one. By the way
this simple fact must be conjectured.
Principle of time linearity: Every time line of a player is a graph topolog-
ically equivalent to a chain (a line) with a starting node (called starting cause)
and an ending node (called final effect).
Now let’s calculate the TLG of our game. The list of action could appear to
be simple
1. S starts the oracle Ω;
2. S gets the prevision from Ω and then it chooses;
3. C chooses;
4. We have the result of the game.
So the TLG should be (1)→ (2)→ (3)→ (4). But it is more complex than this.
When Ω finds what C will do, it starts from (1) arriving to (3). Then it does an
extra step (5) where it elaborates the answer to give to S. Finally it comes back
to (2) to give the answer to S. The future of (2) now has been perturbed by the
prevision, which implies we have 2 new nodes: (6) which is the new movement
of C (equivalent to the node (3)) and (7) which is the new outcome of the game
(equivalent to the node (4)). The resulting graph is depicted in Fig. 2. As can
be seen the TLG is not a chain, but we will see that the time line of every player
it is.
Now we are ready for the time lines of every player. The player C has the
simplest time line, which is
(1)→ (2)→ (3)→ (4).
This player doesn’t know what S and Ω are doing. He just waits an answer
from S.
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Figure 2: In figure is depicted the game time line (solid line) and the alternative
time line (dashed line).
The time line for S is a bit more complicated. S knows that the oracle will
perturb the future. But S is not able to follow Ω, then he just waits an answer
from Ω. So S’s time line is then
(1)→ (2)→ (6)→ (7).
Can be observed that (3) is parallel to (6) and (7) is parallel to (4). So it
seems that the game has two distinct outcomes, if the observer is C the outcome
is (4), while if the observer is S the outcome is (7). To fix this problem we
introduce a key concept: the entanglement between two events. We will define
two events entangled if they share the same outcome. For example events (3)
and (6) are the same event with or without the contribution of Ω. But when C
makes his choice, he does not know what S will choose, so Ω has not influences
on the outcome of (3) and (6). Then these events must have the same outcome
because they are caused by the same events. So they are entangled. We will
express the entanglement with the symbol
(3)↔ (6).
Now we are ready to formulate an other principle.
Principle of Retrocausation: Every time that a time line has a singular-
ity, the singularity split in two or more copies of the singular event entangled
between them.
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The previous principle is the one which justify the creation of the node (6).
But we have an other problem now. The fact that (3) and (6) are entangled
does not guarantee us that the consequences ((4) and (7)) are again entangled.
So we make an other statement.
Principle of Entanglement transmission: The consequences of entan-
gled events are again entangled.
From the previous follows that (4) ↔ (7), which leads to a unique result
(because of the entanglement). Then for Ω the time line is
(1)→ (3)→ (5)→ (2)→ (6)→ (7).
Let’s check it:
• Ω receives the input of A (1);
• Then Ω goes in future C’s choice to answer S (3);
• Ω elaborates the query (5);
• Ω answers S (2);
• Ω sees entangled C’s choice (6);
• Ω sees entangled result (7).
Then all the principles stated have been applied successfully (in particular
the linearity principle). For a brief scheme of all the entanglements see Fig. 3.
5 Time unfolding
We have now all the time lines of all players. Let’s see them again
C : (1)→ (2)→ (3)→ (4),
S : (1)→ (2)→ (6)→ (7),
Ω : (1)→ (3)→ (5)→ (2)→ (6)→ (7).
The first idea to simulate with a computer the problem could be simulate
the simplest time line, so the C’s one. But using this approach we encounter an
insuperable obstacle. We have not an oracle. So simulating this problem in this
way is impossible. The same happens for the time line of S. So the best way
to do it is to take the weirdest way. Then we choose the time line of Ω. In fact
what we observe is that the event (3) in his time line happens before the event
(2). This simple observation leads to an notable consequence. Retrocausation
has caused a twist in the time line of observer Ω. Then causality is not an
invariant for a physical systems but can be perturbed by using an oracle. This
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Figure 3: In figure is shown the entanglement between the nodes representing
the choice of C (Red) and the nodes of the result (Blue).
simple observation has implications in physics but these are out of our aims. By
the way appear clear that we are able to write a program which simulates the
game from the frame of Ω. Thanks to time unfolding caused by the twist of the
time line is possible. We expose a simple MATLAB implementation.
1 % (1) S c a l l s Omega , so the func t i on s t a r t s
2 rng ( ’ s h u f f l e ’ )
3 % (3) C chooses Ci
4 E3=<1 or 2>;
5 % (5) Omega chooses the p r ed i c t i o n
6 pt=p(E3) ;
7 i f rand ( )<pt
8 % keep the p r ev i s i o n
9 E5=E3 ;
10 e l s e
11 % switch the p r ev i s i o n
12 E5=3−E3 ;
13 end
14 % (2) Omega sends the p r ed i c t i o n to S
15 E2=E5 ;
16 % (6) C plays again ( Entangled with (3 ) )
17 E6=E3 ;
18 % (7) Resu l t
19 E7=v(E2 , E6) ;
20 % (4) i s Entangled with (7 )
7
21 E4=E7 ;
22 % End
Where the matrix v is the 2× 2 utility matrix and p is the vector with elements
p1 and p2.
6 Results
Through the the MATLAB implementation has been tested the predictions of
the classical theory in a numerical way. The game has been played N = 50000
times with a parallel code. Then the obtained utilities have been averaged. The
results are shown in tables. In the first test we suppose p1 = p2 = 0.5 (Random
case)
Utility C1 C2
Theoretical 510000 500000
Numerical 516480 496560
and in the second test we suppose p1 = p2 = 1 (Perfect predictor)
Utility C1 C2
Theoretical 10000 1000000
Numerical 10000 1000000
where in the second case we observe that the algorithm is deterministic. Then
the algorithm proposed explains the two classical solutions, which are C1 in the
first test and C2 in the second test.
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